

No. 12,735

IN THE

United States Court of Appeals
For the Ninth Circuit

H. L. JONES, individually and doing
business under the style and trade
name of Standard Seed Farms Com-
pany,

Appellant,

vs.

THE BARTELDES SEED COMPANY
(a corporation),

Appellee.

APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR A REHEARING.

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*To the Honorable William Denman, Chief Judge, and
to the Honorable Associate Judges of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit:*

H. L. Jones, the Appellant in the above entitled cause, respectfully petitions for a rehearing in order that further consideration be given to certain legal principles upon which the opinion rendered in this cause is predicated.

The Appellant urges that a rehearing is justified in this cause on the following grounds:

I.

The trial Court erroneously stated the facts. The opinion herein contains the following:

“The Appellant, a grower and seller of vegetable seeds, with his principal place of business located in Stockton, California, sent his customers a ‘Surplus List’, showing the seeds he had in stock and the prices asked. Attached to the ‘Surplus List’ was a blank form of contract of sale.”

The Court’s statement of facts in this matter is clearly shown to be erroneous by referring to Plaintiff’s Exhibit No. 7 which was printed on page 113 of the transcript of record.

In the oral argument before this Court, the counsel for the Appellee urged the Court that two documents were sent out—a Surplus List and a Contract of Sale. Because it is difficult for this Court to ascertain from the transcript of record the precise form this “Surplus List” was sent out in, we are attaching hereto a photostatic copy of the “Surplus List” for the Court’s inspection. The Court will note that there is no attached contract, but in reality there was only one form submitted on one page with printing on one side, offering certain onion seeds for sale.

The Court, in its opinion, does not seem to have a clear understanding of just exactly what a “Surplus List” is.

The “Surplus List” used by the Appellant was in the form of a contract to grow vegetable seeds. When the Appellant stamped the contract to grow

seeds, with the words "Surplus 1943 Crop", he changed this form from a Contract of Sale into a price list. On page 42 of the transcript of record, we find the following:

"Q. Mr. Jones, I am going to show you this photostatic copy which you were shown on direct examination. I believe it is a photostatic copy of Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 7. Isn't this, Mr. Jones, just a form of printed contract which you were then using under the terms of which you agreed to grow seeds for various purchasers?

A. That is correct, modified by the words 'Surplus 1943 Crop'. If you put the word 'Surplus' on there, it is not an agreement to grow.

Q. In other words, in this particular case, in lieu of furnishing a regular price list, you used one of your contract forms, and distinguished it by putting the word 'Surplus' on it. Is that right?

A. It amounts to the same thing.

Q. It wasn't exactly the same, was it, as your usual price list?

A. It is about the same as my usual price list.

Q. Well, do you use this all the time as a price list?

A. Yes.

Q. I believe you testified on direct examination that 3200 pounds was the total of your crop of yellow globe Danver onions grown or in the warehouse at the particular time that you made your sale to the Barteldes Seed Company?

A. As near as I can recall, that was the testimony and that was the fact."

Mr. Stubbs, the manager of Barteldes Seed Company, who entered into this contract with the Appellant, was in the seed business for at least twenty-five years at the time of the making of this contract. The Court will note, in referring back to Mr. Stubbs' testimony on pages 48 and 49 of the transcript of record, that Mr. Stubbs speaks of the document he received from the Standard Seeds Farm Company as a "Surplus list". The fact that he wasn't confused as to the nature of a "Surplus List" is shown by the fact that he immediately called the Appellant on long distance telephone and offered to buy seeds that were offered for sale for immediate delivery. This is also shown in the various exhibits in the transcript of record confirming the sale "For Prompt Shipment". It is the contention of this Appellant that the "Surplus List" was definitely within the area negotiated and was covered by the telephone conversation which formed this contract, and that the purchaser knew, or should have known, that the provisions of the "Surplus List", disclaiming liability for Breach of Warranty in the description of the onion seeds was truly applicable to this sale. The law covering the application of the usual seedman's disclaimer has been stated at greater length on page 12 to page 19 of the Appellant's Opening Brief.

The Court will note that the disclaimer sent out in the Surplus List read as follows, "Except as *herein* otherwise expressly provided * * *", after which came the usual seedman's disclaimer.

The Court then reasoned that the disclaimer provided for exceptions to the non-warranty provisions and the words uttered concerning variety by the *Appellee* to the *Appellant* constituted such an exception on the part of the Appellant. This is clearly erroneous. The disclaimer can only be interpreted to mean that unless a definite warranty were given in the surplus list itself, then no warranty would be given.

II.

The opinion of this Court stated that,

“Disagreement existed between counsel for appellant and appellee as to whether the law of California or that of Colorado should be applied in construing the contract. We think it immaterial because both California and Colorado have adopted the Uniform Sales Act, which, in our opinion, governs the transaction in issue here”.

The Appellant notes that this is a unique statement of the law, and is not backed by any citation of authority. We submit to the Court on this issue the following authorities:

Federal Courts, in diversity of citizenship cases, are governed by the conflict of laws rules of the Courts of the states in which they sit.

Griffin v. McCoach (Texas, 1941), 61 S. Ct. 1023,
313 U.S. 489, 85 L. Ed. 1481, 134 A.L.R. 1462.

“Where jurisdiction of a Delaware Federal Court was based on diversity of citizenship, the

Supreme Court's views were not the decisive factor in determining the applicable conflicts rule, and the proper function of the Del. Federal Court was to ascertain what the state law was and not what it ought to be."

Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co. (Del., 1941), 61 S. Ct. 1021, 313 U.S. 47, 85 L. Ed. 1477.

This Court has before it a case of diversity of citizenship, and following the law laid down by the authorities above quoted, the trial Court should have necessarily found, as a matter of fact, that the California conflict of law rules apply to the facts here presented. That the California substantive law applied to whether or not there was a failure in the performance of the contract.

We respectfully submit to this Court that this was a material issue in the case, that a finding of fact should have been made on this issue and there not being such a finding of fact was prejudicial error to the Appellant.

III.

The decision erroneously states that an express warranty of description arose when the Appellant assured the Appellee the seeds were of first-class quality and of high germination. The uniform sales act defines an Express Warranty as "any affirmation of fact or any promise by the *seller* relating to the goods * * *".

In searching the transcript of record, we fail to find, even in the Appellee's testimony, any assurance made by the *Appellant* that the goods were true to type. Let us, for the sake of argument, assume that the Appellant had given an Express Warranty. Even then the Court in its opinion apparently did not consider the authorities directly on this issue, where a disclaimer of warranty is involved. The law on this subject has been set out in detail in Vol. 160, American Law Reports, page 360, and we respectfully request this Court that it consider these authorities.

One of the later cases involving the sale of seeds and dealing with a disclaimer clause is *Belt Seed Company v. Mitchellhill Seed Company*, 153 SW 2nd, 106. The Defendant wired the Plaintiff offering to sell grass seed of special weight and 77% purity and 80% germination. The Plaintiff wired the Defendant accepting a certain amount of the seed so quoted. The Defendant, on the day of the receipt of the telegram, accepting the offer of sale, confirmed the sale by letter on which letterhead was printed the Standard Seedman's Disclaimer, that the Defendant gives no Warranty, express or implied, as to description, quality or productiveness of any of the seeds it sends out, and will not be in any way responsible for the crop. The basis of the plaintiff's action was Breach of Warranty in that the seed did not test 80% germination. The Defendant appealed the adverse Judgment in the law Court, and the Appellate Court ruled in favor of the Defendant. The questions raised in this case

were substantially the same as the questions raised in the case at bar. The Court held the following:

“So far as we are able to ascertain the authorities are unanimous in holding that, where the word ‘warranty’ or its equivalent does not appear in the contract, but there is some language appearing in it and it, and the surrounding circumstances, standing alone, might give rise to an inference merely that a warranty was intended, such inference cannot be drawn in the face of positive and explicit language in other parts of the contract showing that no warranty was given or intended, such as contained in the non-warranty provisions in the defendant’s confirmation of sale and the letter of November 15th, 1927. *Davis v. Bertrand Seed Co.*, 94 Cal. App. 281, 271 P. 123; *Leonard Seed Co. v. Crary Canning Co.*, 147 Wis. 166, 132 N.W. 902, 37 L.R.A., N.S., 79, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 1077; *Seattle Seed Co. v. Fujimori*, 79 Wash. 123, 139 P. 866; *Larson v. Inland Seed Co.*, 143 Wash. 557, 255 P. 919, 62 A.L.R. 444; *Ross v. Northrup, King & Co.*, 156 Wis. 327, 144 N.W. 1124; *Reynolds v. Binding-Stevens Seed Co.*, 179 Okl. 628, 67 P.2d 440; *Manglesdorf Seed Co. v. Busby et al.*, 118 Okl. 255, 247 P. 410; *Blizzard Bros. v. Growers’ Canning Co.*, 152 Iowa 257 257, 132 N.W. 66; *Miller v. Germain Seed & Plant Co.*, 193 Cal. 62, 222 P. 817, 32 A.L.R. 1215. ‘Parties may by an express provision in the contract exclude any warranty as to kind from being imported from words descriptive of the kind of seed sold.’ 24 R.C.L. p. 176.

The question of whether a representation is a warranty depends on its having been affirmed as a fact; it must have been understood by the parties as having that character, it must be positive and unequivocal and not merely a vague, ambiguous, and indefinite statement of the seller regarding the property. A representation of fact made to induce the sale, and to be relied on, and which is relied on by the buyer, is a warranty unless accompanied by an express statement that it is not so intended, at least if the representation is understood by the parties as an absolute assertion. 55 C.J. pp. 677, 678, 679, 680. See, also, 24 R.C.L. pp. 164, 165. We are of the opinion that, under all of the circumstances, the statement by defendant that the seed would germinate 80% was merely the expression of an opinion. *Davis v. Bertrand Seed Co.*, supra, 94 Cal. App. 281, 271 P. loc. cit. 126."

The Court will note that as the main authority for the ruling of the Judgment in this case the Court has repeatedly cited *Davis v. Bertram Seed Company*, 94 C.A. 281. We have constantly urged that the law of the State of California covers this transaction and by the law of the State of California, the defendant was not liable for Breach of Warranty.

In conclusion, the Appellant respectfully requests the Court that it correct its erroneous statement of facts set forth in its opinion to show that there was only one paper sent out and that was a Surplus List, and that on the Surplus List was printed a Disclaimer,

which negatived any statement that the seller, a seedman for twenty-five years, would feel would be a Warranty.

Dated, Stockton, California,
November 16, 1951.

Respectfully submitted,

JAMES I. HARKINS,

ALBERT E. CRONIN, JR.,

*Attorneys for Appellant
and Petitioner.*

CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL.

I, Albert E. Cronin, Jr., one of counsel for Appellant, hereby certify that in my judgment the foregoing petition is well founded and that it is not interposed for the purpose of delay.

Dated, Stockton, California,
November 16, 1951.

ALBERT E. CRONIN, JR.,
*Of Counsel for Appellant
and Petitioner.*

MEMORANDUM

Ps. type label no. 7

Standard Seed Farms Company

STOCKTON, CALIFORNIA

CONTRACT PRICE LIST
VEGETABLE SEEDS

SEASON OF

1943

SURPLUS

1943 CROP

CABLE ADDRESS
STANSEED

POST OFFICE BOX
NO. 872